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Abstract
We determine optimal government default policies for a small open economy
in which a domestic government can borrow internationally by issuing non-
contingent debt contracts. Unlike earlier work, we consider optimal default
policies under full government commitment and treat repayment of interna-
tional debt as a decision variable. Default can be optimal under commitment
because it allows for increased international diversication of domestic out-
put and consumption risk when government bond markets are incomplete.
In the absence of default costs, default optimally occurs very frequently and
independently of the countrys net foreign asset position. Optimal default
policies, however, change drastically when a government default entails small
but positive dead weight costs: default is then optimal only in response to
disaster-like shocks to domestic output, or when a small adverse shock pushes
international debt levels su¢ ciently close to the countrys borrowing limit.
Optimal default policies increase welfare signicantly compared to a situa-
tion where default is ruled out by assumption, even for sizable default costs.
For su¢ ciently low level of default costs the optimal default policies can ap-
proximately be replicated by issuing a simple equity-like government bond.
JEL Class. No.: E62, F34
1 Introduction
Sovereign debt crises are by no means rare events in history.1 These crises and
the subsequent debt defaults are widely believed to occur because governments
are simply unwilling to honor initially promised payment streams and because
there exist insu¢ cient incentives making repayment optimal ex-post from the
countrys perspective. The weakness of ex-post incentives is thereby routinely
attributed to sovereign immunitywhich presumably protects governments
from being sued in courts.2 Viewed through this lens, the option of a sovereign
to default is ine¢ cient from an ex-ante welfare perspective, as anticipation
of a possible default constrains international borrowing to suboptimally low
levels.
In this paper we propose to interpret sovereign default events in a fun-
damentally di¤erent way. Instead of being the result of insu¢ cient ex-post
incentives in a situation without commitment, we propose to interpret sov-
ereign defaults as an opportunity for more e¢ cient international risk sharing
in a situation where government debt is non-contingent. This interpretation
has previously been advanced in Grossmann and Van Huyck (1988) who dis-
tinguish between excusableand non-excusabledefault, with the rst being
part of an ex-ante anticipated risk-sharing arrangement between the borrower
and the lender, and the latter being the result of debt repudiation in the pres-
ence of weak ex-post incentives for repayment. Unlike Grossmann and Van
Huyck, however, we consider a situation where the government possesses full
commitment, thus discuss optimal borrowing and default from a purely nor-
mative perspective. And as we show, it has profound implications for the
optimal default patterns. While in models with limited commitment the in-
centives to default are strongest in good times3, the present model predicts
default to be optimal in low output states.
The assumption of committed sovereigns is more plausible than generally
recognized in the economics literature. First, as argued in Panizza, Sturzeneg-
ger and Zettelmeyer (2009), legal changes in a range of countries in the late
1970s and early 1980s eliminated the legal principle of sovereign immunity
when it comes to sovereign borrowing. Specically, in the U.S. and the U.K.
1Over the past decade governments in Argentina, Uruguay, Moldova and the Dominican
Republic partially defaulted on their debt, with the Argentinian default being in dollar terms
the largest ever recorded in history. The governments in Greece, Ireland and Portugal have
recently been forced to apply for foreign assistance.
2Following this view, the main economic puzzle is then to explain how government debt
can exist at all, if debt repudiation is an option available to sovereign debtors. An important
literature, starting with the classic paper by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and ranging all
the way to recent contribution by Broner, Martin and Ventura (2010), has examined this
view.
3Grossmann and Van Huyck (1988), for example, state: the incentive to repudiate is
largest in the good state (p.1095). Recent work by Mendoza and Yue (2008) overcomes
this problem and generates counterycyclical default by incorporating the e¤ects of sovereign
default on the default of domestic rms and the availability of foreign imports as inputs
into domestic production.
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private parties can sue foreign governments in courts, if the complaint relates
to a commercial activity, amongst which courts regularly count the issuance
of sovereign bonds. Second, although there now exists a voluminous liter-
ature on potential mechanisms supporting sovereign debt in the absence of
commitment, these mechanisms have received limited empirical support.4 In
the light of these facts, it appears natural to deduce that governments can
issue debt simply because they can in fact credibly commit to repay debt in
some future states of the world, although they might actually choose not to
repay in some states in which repayment turns out to be excessively costly.
To analyze the role of sovereign debt default as a vehicle for international
risk shifting in a setting with a committed government, we construct a small
open economy with production in which a domestic government can interna-
tionally borrow by issuing non-contingent bonds. The government can also
accumulate international reserves by investing in (riskless) bonds issued by
foreign lenders. The domestic economy is subject to shocks that a¤ect the
productivity of the domestic capital stock and the government can smooth
the consumption implications of such shocks either via borrowing and lending
in international capital markets or via defaulting on its debt. The paper is
concerned with the question of which channel the government should rely on
to smooth domestic consumption, and specically with the question: when is
it optimal to (partially) default on government debt in a setting with a fully
committed government?
In a rst step, we analytically show that in the absence of default costs,
optimal government default decisions can implement the rst best consump-
tion allocation and achieve full domestic consumption smoothing. The level of
default is then generally decreasing with aggregate productivity and (partial)
debt default occurs frequently and for all but the best productivity realization.
In the absence of default costs, allowing the government to choose whether or
not to repay government debt is thus a way to achieve the same consumption
allocation as in a setting with a complete set of contingent government debt
instruments.
In a second step, we introduce default costs. These costs feature promi-
nently in political discussions and we model them as a simple dead weight cost
that is proportional to the size of the government debt default. We show how
low levels for the default costs make it generally optimal for the government
not to default following business cycle sized shocks. Only when the coun-
trys net foreign debt position approaches the maximum level implied by the
(marginally binding) natural borrowing limits, is a sovereign default still op-
timal after an adverse shock. With positive default costs, the optimal default
policy thus depends on whether or not the country is close to its maximally
sustainable net foreign debt position.
4 In the words of Panizza et al. (2009): Almost three decades after Eaton and Gersovitz
pathbreaking contribution there still exists no fully satisfactory answer to how sovereign
debt can exist in the rst place. None of the default punishments that the classic theory of
sovereign debt has focused on appears to enjoy much empirical backing(p. 692).
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Given that small amounts of default costs largely eliminate government
debt default, we introduce economic disaster risk into the aggregate pro-
ductivity process, following Barro and Jin (2011). Default then reemerges
as part of optimal government policy, following the occurrence of a disaster
shock. This is the case even for sizable default costs and even when the coun-
trys net foreign asset position is far from its maximally sustainable level. It
continues to be optimal, however, not to default following business cycle sized
shocks to aggregate productivity, as long as the net foreign debt position is
not too close to its maximal level.
Finally, we evaluate the utility consequences of using the government de-
fault option as a way to insure domestic consumption against aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks, comparing it to a situation where the government is assumed
to repay debt unconditionally. In the latter case the government can use in-
ternational wealth adjustments only to smooth domestic consumption. We
show that the consumption equivalent welfare gain from considering default
is in the order of one to two percentage points of consumption each period,
even when there are sizable dead weight cost associated with a government
debt default. If the default costs are su¢ ciently low, a large share of this
welfare increase can be captured if instead of defaulting, the government op-
timally issues a combination on non-defaultable bonds and equity-like bonds
that do not repay when one of the economic disaster states materializes. We
thereby assume that non-repayment on the equity bond generates the same
dead weight costs as an outright default. For higher levels of the dead weight
costs, we show that outright default dominates the issuance of a combination
of non-defaultable and equity bonds.
Sims (2001) discusses insurance in the context of whether or not Mexico
should dollarize its economy, showing that giving up the domestic currency
allows for less insurance in the presence of non-contingent nominal debt be-
cause the government is deprived of using the price level as a shock absorber.
Unlike in the work of Sims, who considers non-contingent nominal bonds, the
present paper considers a setting with non-contingent real bonds and consid-
ers optimal outright default policies. In the light of Simsdiscussion, one could
interpret the setting analyzed in the present paper as one in which the gov-
ernment issues (non-contingent) nominal bonds but has given up control over
monetary policy and the price level, e.g., via joining a monetary union. As
we show, the default option then still provides the country with a mechanism
to make bond repayments contingent.
Angeletos (2002) explores an alternative insurance channel in a closed
economy setting, showing that a government can use the maturity structure
of domestic government bonds to insure against domestic shocks. This is
achieved by exploiting the fact that bond yields of di¤erent maturities react
di¤erently to domestic shocks. This channel is unavailable, however, in our
small open economy setting: in the absence of domestic default, the domestic
yield curve is identical to the foreign yield curve for risk free assets and thus
also independent of domestic shocks.
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Juessen, Linnemann and Schabert (2010) also analyze government default
and the behavior of government bond premia. Considering a setting in which
government behavior is characterized by simple rules, they show that multiple
equilibria with di¤erent risk premia and default probabilities exist.
The present paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the eco-
nomic model and derives the optimal policy problem. It also determines an
equivalent formulation of the optimal policy problem that facilitates numer-
ical solution of optimal policies. Section 3 derives an analytical result for
the case with no default costs and section 4 evaluates the e¤ects of intro-
ducing default costs in a setting with business cycle sized shocks. We then
introduce economic disaster shocks in section 5 and discuss their quantitative
implications for optimal default policies. In section 6 we consider the welfare
implications of using the default option and show how optimal default poli-
cies can approximately be implemented with a simple equity-like government
bond instrument. In section 7 we discuss the e¤ects of introducing long matu-
rity bonds. A conclusion briey summarizes. Technical material is contained
in a series of appendices.
2 The Model
This section introduces a small open production economy and derives the
governments optimal policy problem.
2.1 Private Sector: Households and Firms
The household side of the domestic economy is described by a representative
consumer with utility function
E0
1X
t=0
tu(ct) (1)
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the discount factor and u(c) the period utility func-
tion. The latter is assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable, increasing
in c and strictly concave, for all values of c > c where c  0 denotes the subsis-
tence level for consumption. We shall assume that u(c) =  1 for all c  c and
that Inada conditions hold, i.e., limc!c+ u0(c) = +1 and limc!1 u0(c) = 0.
The production side of the economy is described by a representative rm
which produces consumption goods using the production function
yt = ztk

t 1;
where yt denotes output in period t, kt 1 the capital stock from the previous
period,  2 (0; 1) the capital share, and zt > 0 an exogenous stochastic
productivity disturbance. Productivity shocks assume values from some nite
set Z =

z1; :::; zN
	
with N 2 N. The transition probabilities for productivity
across periods are described by some measure (z0jz) for z0; z 2 Z. Firms are
owned by households and must decide on the capital stock one period in
advance, i.e., before future productivity is known. For simplicity we assume
that capital depreciates fully after one period.
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2.2 The Government
The government seeks to maximize the utility of the representative domestic
household (1) and is fully committed to its plans. It can invest in riskless
international bonds issued by foreign lenders, issue own non-contingent bonds,
and decide on the repayment of its maturing bonds. Unless otherwise stated,
we assume that the risk free interest rate r on international bonds satises
1
1+r = . Furthermore, we assume that all bonds are zero coupon bonds and
have a maturity of one period. The e¤ects of introducing also longer maturity
domestic bonds are discussed in section 7.5
The governments holdings of international bonds in period t (which ma-
ture in period t + 1) constitutes a long position and is denoted by GLt  0.
The own (potentially risky) bonds issued by the government in period t rep-
resents a short position and is denoted by GSt  0. The government can use
adjustments in the long and short positions to insure domestic consumption
against domestic productivity shocks. In addition, it can decide in period t
to (partially) default on the bonds maturing in period t + 1. More formally,
the default decision is described by a vector of default proles
t = (
1
t ; :::; 
N
t ) 2 [0; 1]N ;
where nt 2 [0; 1] denotes the fraction of outstanding domestic bonds issued in
period t that is not repaid in period t+ 1 when the bonds mature and when
the productivity state is zt+1 = zn. Default is thus state-contingent and
an entry equal to zero indicates full repayment. Full repayment is typically
assumed in much of the previous literature dealing with optimal scal policy
under commitment with incomplete markets, e.g., Angeletos (2002), Buera
and Nicolini (2004) or Marcet and Scott (2009). In our setting repayment is
treated as a choice variable.
Total repayment on maturing domestic bonds in period t + 1 when pro-
ductivity is equal to zt+1 is then given by
GSt  (1  (1  )I(zt+1)t )
where I(zt+1) denotes the index of the productivity shock, i.e., I(zt+1) = n
if and only if zt+1 = zn. The parameter   0 captures the possibility
that the governments default decision gives rise to dead weight costs. Our
specication assumes that these dead weight costs are proportional to the
size of the absolute debt default chosen by the government. For  = 0 a
default does not produce any additional costs: by defaulting the government
then gains resources equal to GSt 
I(zt+1)
t relative to the case without default
and foreign lenders loose the corresponding amount. A setting with  >
0 indicates that the governments default produces additional costs for the
5The fact that we consider only a single maturity for the international bond is without
loss of generality. Since foreign interest rates are independent of domestic conditions, the
government cannot use the maturity structure of foreign bonds to insure against domestic
shocks.
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government that are not accruing to lenders. This is a short-cut to capture
costs that are associated with having to defend legal positions in foreign courts
or with possible disruptions in the nancial system following a sovereign debt
default.
We can now dene the amount of resources available to the domestic
government at the beginning of the period, i.e., before issuing new debt and
making investment decisions on international bonds, but after (partial) repay-
ment of maturing bonds.6 We refer to these resources as beginning-of-period
wealth and dene them as
wt  ztkt 1 +GLt 1  GSt 1  (1  (1  )I(zt)t 1 )
Beginning-of-period wealth will serve as a useful state variable when comput-
ing optimal government policies later on. The government can raise additional
resources in period t by issuing own government bonds. It can then use the
resulting funds to invest in international riskless bonds, to invest in the do-
mestic capital stock, and to nance domestic consumption. The economys
budget constraint is thus given by
ct + kt +
1
1 + r
GLt = wt +
1
1 +R(zt;t)
GSt
where 11+r denotes the price of the risk-free international bond and
1
1+R(zt;t)
the
price of the domestic bond. The real interest rate R(zt;t) of the domestic
bond depends on the default prole t chosen by the government and on the
current productivity state, as it may a¤ect the likelihood of entering di¤erent
states tomorrow. Due to the small open economy assumption, the government
takes the pricing function R(; ) as given in its optimization problem. Assum-
ing risk-neutral international lenders, no-arbitrage implies that the pricing
function for domestic bonds is given by
1
1 +R(zt;t)
=
1
1 + r
NX
n=1
(1  nt )  (znjzt)
so that the expected return on the domestic bond is equal to the return on
the riskless international bond.
We are now in a position to formulate the governments optimal policy
6Below we do not distinguish between the government budget and the household budget,
instead consider the economy wide resources that are available. This implicitly assumes that
the government can costlessly transfer resources between these two budgets, e.g., via lump
sum taxes.
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problem (Ramsey allocation problem):
max
fGLt 0;GSt 0;t2[0;1]N ;kt0;ctcg
E0
1X
t=0
tu(ct) (2a)
s:t: : ct = wt   kt + G
S
t
1 +R(zt;t)
  G
L
t
1 + r
(2b)
wt+1  NBL(zt+1) 8zt+1 2 Z (2c)
w0; z0 : given
We have added the natural borrowing limits (2c) so as to prevent explosive
debt dynamics (Ponzi schemes). In our numerical application we will set the
natural borrowing limits (NBLs) to values such that they are just marginally
binding, as this facilitates computation. Since these marginally binding limits
may depend on the state of the productivity shock, we make this dependence
explicit here. Imposing laxer and possibly non-contingent natural borrowing
limits would have no implication for the optimal policies. We also assume that
initial conditions are such that there exists a solution with wt  NBL(zt) for
all t and all possible realizations zt 2 Z.
While intuitive, the formulation of the optimization problem (2) has a
number of unattractive features. First, the price of the domestic government
bond depends on the chosen default prole, so that constraint (2b) fails to
be linear in the governments choice variables. It is thus unclear whether
problem (2) is concave. Second, the inequality constraints for GLt , G
S
t and
especially those for t are di¢ cult to handle computationally, as they will
be occasionally binding.7 Moreover, the optimal default policies t turn out
to be discontinuous. For these reasons, we derive in the next section an
equivalent formulation of the problem that can be shown to be concave, that
features fewer occasionally binding inequality constraints, and gives rise to
continuos optimal policy functions.
2.3 Equivalent Formulation of the Government Problem
We now formulate an alternative optimal policy problem with a di¤erent asset
structure than in problem (2) and thereafter show that it is equivalent to the
original problem (2).
Specically, we assume that there exist N Arrow securities and a single
riskless bond in which the country can go either long or short. The vector of
Arrow security holdings is denoted by a 2 RN and the n-th Arrow security
pays one unit of output tomorrow if productivity state zn materializes. The
associated price vector is denoted by p 2 RN . Given the risk-neutrality of
international lenders, the price of the n-th Arrow security in period t is
pt(z
n) =
1
1 + r
(znjzt): (3)
7The fact that marginal utility increases without bound as ct ! c and that marginal
productivity of capital increases without bound as kt ! 0 will insure interior solutions for
these two choice variables, allowing to ignore the inequality constraints for these variables
when computing numerical solutions.
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Letting b denote the countrys holdings of riskless bonds, beginning-of-period
wealth for this asset structure is then given by
ewt  ztekt 1 + bt 1 + (1  )at 1(zt) (4)
where at 1(zt) denotes the amount of Arrow securities purchased for state
zt, ekt 1 capital invested in the previous period, and   0 is the parameter
capturing potential default costs in the original problem (2).
Next, consider the following alternative optimization problem:
max
fbt;at0;ekt0;ectcg E0
1X
t=0
tu(ect) (5a)
s:t: 8t : ect= ewt   ekt   1
1 + r
bt   pt  at (5b)ewt+1NBL(zt+1) 8zt+1 2 Zew0 = w0; z0 given:
Problem (5) has the same concave objective function as problem (2), but
the constraint (5b) is now linear in the choices, so that rst order conditions
(FOCs) are necessary and su¢ cient. The FOCs can be found in appendix
A.1. Furthermore, problem (5) reveals that the optimization problem has a
recursive structure with the state in period t being described by the vector
(zt; ewt), allowing us to express optimal policy functions as a function of these
two state variables only. Finally, the relevant inequality constraints are given
by at  0and the marginally binding natural borrowing limits.8
We now show that if a consumption path fctg1t=0 is feasible in problem
(2), then is it also feasible in problem (5), and vice versa, i.e., the two di¤erent
asset structures allow to implement the same set of consumption paths. One
can thus use the solution to problem (5), which is easier to compute, to derive
the asset structure and default proles implementing the same consumption
path in the original problem (2).
Consider some state contingent beginning-of-period wealth prole wt aris-
ing from some combination of bond holdings, default decisions and capital
investment (GLt 1; GSt 1; t 1; kt 1) in problem (2). We now show that
one can generate the same state contingent beginning-of-period wealth proleewt = wt in problem (5) by choosing ekt 1 = kt 1 and by choosing an appropri-
ate investment prole (at 1; bt 1). Moreover, the funds required to purchase
(at 1; bt 1) are the same as those required to purchase
 
GLt 1; GSt 1

when the
default prole is t 1. With the costs of nancial investments being the same
in both problems, identical physical investments, and identical beginning of
period wealth proles, it then follows from constraints (2b) and (5b) that the
8As before, the Inada conditions on utility and the fact that marginal productivity of
capital increases without bound as kt ! 0 will insure interior solutions for ct and kt, allowing
to ignore the inequality constraints for these variables when computing numerical solutions.
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implied consumption paths are also the same in both problems, establishing
the equivalence between the two problems.
To keep notation as simple as possible we establish the previous claim for
the case with 2 productivity states only. The extension toN states is relatively
straightforward. Consider the following state contingent initial wealth prole
wt(z
1)
wt(z2)

=

z1kt 1 +GLt 1  GSt 1(1  (1  )1t 1)
z2kt 1 +GLt 1  GSt 1(1  (1  )2t 1)

:
One can replicate this beginning-of-period wealth prole in problem (5) by
choosing ekt 1 = kt 1 and by choosing the portfolio
bt 1=GLt 1  GSt 1; (6)
at 1=

GSt 1
1
GSt 1
2

(7)
The previous equations show that b in problem (5) has an interpretation as
the net foreign asset position in problem (2) and that a in problem (5) can
be interpreted as the state contingent default on outstanding own bonds. We
will make use of this interpretation in the latter part of the paper. The funds
ft 1 required for (GLt 1; GSt 1) under the default prole (
1
t 1; 
2
t 1) are given
by
ft 1 =
1
1 + r
GLt 1  
1
1 +R(zt 1; (1t 1; 
2
t 1))
GSt 1
where the interest rate satises
1
1 +R(zt 1; (1t 1; 
2
t 1))
=
1
1 + r
 
(1  1t 1)(z1jzt 1) + (1  2t 1)(z2jzt 1)

:
The funds eft 1 required to purchase (bt 1; at 1) are
eft 1 = 1
1 + r
(GLt 1  GSt 1) +
1
1 + r
 
1t 1(z
1 jzt 1) + 2t 1(z2 jzt 1)

GSt 1;
where we used the price of the Arrow security in (3). As is easy to seeeft 1 = ft, as claimed.
Finally, note that we need to impose the restriction a  0 on problem (5),
as otherwise it would follow from equation (7) that one could implement a
consumption path in problem (5) that cannot be implemented in problem (2)
with values of i satisfying i 2 [0; 1] for all i. This completes the equivalence
proof.
3 Zero Default Costs
In the absence of default costs, the solution to problem (5) can be analytically
determined. The following proposition summarizes the main nding. The
proof can be found in appendix A.2.
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Proposition 1 Without default costs ( = 0) the solution to problem (5)
involves constant consumption equal to
c = (1  )((z0) + ew0) (8)
where () denotes the maximized expected prots from future production,
dened as
(zt)  Et
24 1X
j=0
j ( k(zt+j) + zt+j+1 (k(zt+j)))
35
with
k(zt) = (E(zt+1jzt))
1
1  (9)
denoting the prot maximizing capital level. For any period t, the optimal
default level satises
at(zt) /   ((zt) + zt (k(zt 1))) (10)
The proposition shows that in the absence of default costs, it is optimal
to fully smooth consumption. The option of partial repayment thus allows
for complete insurance of domestic production risk, as would be the case
in a complete market setting. Equation (10) thereby reveals that default
must occur frequently and for virtually all productivity realizations.9 Default
thereby insures the country against two components: rst, against (adverse)
news regarding the expected protability of future investments, as captured
by (zt); and second, against low output due to a low realization of current
productivity, as captured by zt (k(zt 1)). If expected future prots com-
move positively with current productivity, e.g. if zt is a persistent process, or
in the special case with iid productivity shocks, where expected future prots
are independent of current productivity, it follows from equation (10) that
optimal default levels are inversely related to the current level of productiv-
ity. Default is then optimal whenever zt falls short of its highest possible
value and the optimal size of default is increasing in the amount by which
productivity falls short if its highest possible level.
4 Optimal Default Policies with Default Costs
The previous section abstracted from potential dead weight costs associated
with a government debt default decision. The trade-o¤ between insuring con-
sumption via default or via (international) wealth accumulation/decumulation
is then resolved fully in favor of using the default option. As is clear from
equation (4), however, it becomes optimal to rely exclusively on self-insurance
via international wealth adjustments, i.e., to set at  0, if the dead weight
9Default is not required for states zt achieving the maximal value for (zt)+zt(k(zt 1))
across all zt 2 Z. For such states default can be set equal to zero, otherwise default levels
are strictly positive.
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costs from default become su¢ ciently high, e.g., if   1. To evaluate how
the trade-o¤ between default and self-insurance is resolved for intermediate
levels of default costs, we now consider a quantitative setup with business
cycle shocks to aggregate productivity. As we show below, fairly low levels of
default costs then make it optimal to almost exclusive rely on self-insurance
through international reserve adjustments. Only when the countrys net for-
eign asset position is su¢ ciently close to the (marginally binding) natural
borrowing limits, will it be optimal to default on government debt.
4.1 Calibration
We now calibrate the model. A standard parameterization for quarterly pro-
ductivity is given by a rst order autoregressive process with quarterly persis-
tence of 0.9 and a standard deviation of 0.5% for the quarterly innovation.10
Since we use a yearly model, we annualize these values by choosing an annual
persistence of technology equal to (0:9)4 and use an annual standard devi-
ation of the innovation of 1%. We then use Tauchens (1986) procedure to
discretize the shock process into a process with a high and a low productivity
state. Normalizing average productivity to one, the resulting high productiv-
ity state is zh = 1:0133 and the low productivity state z2 = 0:9868. The
procedure also yields the following transition matrix for the states
 =

0:8077 0:1923
0:1923 0:8077

:
We set the capital share parameter in the production function to  = 0:34.
The annual discount factor is  = 0:97 and we consider households with a
ow utility function given by
u(c) =
(c  c)1 
1  
where c  0 denotes the subsistence level of consumption and  parameter-
izes risk aversion. We choose  = 2 and calibrate the subsistence level of
consumption c such that in an economy where the government is forced to re-
pay debt always, the marginally binding natural borrowing limit implies that
the net foreign asset position of the country is not below  100% of average
GDP in any productivity state.11 We thereby seek to capture the fact that in-
dustrialized countries do not appear to have net foreign asset positions below
10The quantitative results reported below are not very sensitive to the precise numbers
used. A similar calibration is employed in Adam (2011).
11Appendix A.4 explains how one can compute the marginally binding NBL for each
productivity state. Average GDP is dened as the average output level associated with
e¢ cient investment, i.e., when kt = k(zt) each period, and where we average over the
ergodic distribution of the z process. For our parameterization this yields an average output
level of 0:5661. Furthermore, the net foreign asset position of the country is independent
of government policy at the marginally binding NBL, instead exlusivley determined by the
desire to prevent debt from exploding, so that this measure can be used to calibrate the
model. The resulting level for subsistence onsumption is c = 0:357.
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Figure 1: Optimal Default Policies: The E¤ect of Default Costs
 100% of GDP, see gure 10 in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Moreover,
three out of the ve industrialized countries approaching this boundary in
the year 2004 later on faced scal solvency problems (Greece, Portugal and
Iceland). It thus appears plausible to assume that countries cannot sustain
higher external debt levels without running the risk of a government default.
Positive default costs and the small open economy assumption imply that
the equilibrium outcomes are non-stationary, unless we choose 1+r < 1=. To
insure that the equilibrium process is ergodic, we set the annual international
interest rate ve basis points below the rate implied by the inverse of the
discount factor. Optimal default policies are rather robust to the precise
number chosen.12
12We also experimented with larger gaps of 50 basis points.
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4.2 Evaluating the E¤ect of Default Costs
Figure 1 reports the optimal default policies for the next period as a function
of the current (end-of period) net foreign asset position and the current pro-
ductivity state.13 Each row in the gure thereby corresponds to a di¤erent
default cost parameterization (). To simplify the interpretation of results,
the default policies and the net foreign asset positions are normalized by av-
erage GDP. The panels on the left thereby depicts the optimal default policy
in the high productivity state (zh) and the panels on the right policy for the
low productivity state (zl). Appendix A.3 explains how the optimal policies
can be determined numerically.
The graphs shown in the rst row of gure 1 report the outcome for
the case when default costs are zero.14 Specically, they depict the optimal
amount of default in the next period, when the future productivity state hap-
pens to be low (zl). Note that there will never be default if the productivity
state zh realizes in the next period. Interestingly, the optimal amount of
default is independent of the countrys net foreign asset position and almost
independent of the current state of productivity.15 As is clear from proposition
1, these default policies fully insure future consumption against uctuations
in productivity.
The middle and bottom rows in gure 1 report the optimal default policies
when default costs equal 5% and 10% of the defaulted amount, respectively.
For large parts of the state space default then ceases to be optimal. More-
over, there is less default in the future if the current productivity state is low
already. This is optimal because insurance against a future low state is more
costly when current productivity state is low already, due to the persistence
of productivity. Default continues to be optimal, however, if the net foreign
asset position is su¢ ciently negative. Marginal utility of consumption is then
very sensitive to further consumption uctuations, because consumption ap-
proaches its subsistence level as the net foreign asset position approaches the
limits implied by the (marginally binding) naturally borrowing limits.
Overall, gure 1 shows that moderate levels of default costs shift optimal
policy strongly towards using adjustments in international wealth to insure
domestic consumption. Only if the countrys net foreign asset position ap-
proaches the borrowing limit will a government debt default still be optimal.
5 Optimal Default and Economic Disasters
The previous section showed that with moderate levels of default costs it be-
comes suboptimal to default on government debt, provided the country is not
too close to its borrowing limit. In this section we evaluate whether this con-
13As explained in section 2.3, the net foreign asset position is given by the optimal value
of b in the corresponding period.
14Since there exists a multiplicity of optimal default policies when  = 0, the rst row
shows the outcome in the limiting case ! 0
15From equation (10) follows that the default in the next period does depend on the
current state because the optimal investment k(zt) depends on the current productivity.
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clusion continues to be true for a setting with much larger economic shocks.
This is motivated by the observation that countries occasionally experience
very large negative shocks, as previously argued by Rietz (1988) and Barro
(2006), and that such shocks tend to be associated with a government de-
fault.16 To capture the possibility of large shocks, we augment the model by
including disaster like shocks to aggregate productivity and then explore the
quantitative implications of disaster risk on optimal government debt default
decisions.
5.1 Calibrating Economic Disasters
To capture economic disasters we introduce two disaster sized productivity
levels to our aggregate productivity process. We add two disaster states rather
than a single one to capture the idea that the size of economic disasters is
uncertain ex-ante. This will become important in section 6, when we dis-
cuss how well simple nancial instruments can approximate optimal default
policies.
We calibrate the disaster shocks to match the mean and variance of GDP
disasters, as documented in Barro and Jin (2011). Using a sample of 157
GDP disasters, they report a mean reduction in GDP of 20:4% and a standard
deviation of 12:64%. Assuming that it is equally likely to enter both disaster
states, this yields the productivity states zd = 0:9224 and zdd = 0:6696.
Our vector of possible productivity realizations thus takes the form Z =
zh; zl; zd; zdd
	
where the parameterization of the business cycle states
 
zh; zl

is the same as in the previous section. The state transition matrix for the
shock process is given by
 =
0BB@
0:7770 0:1850 0:019 0:019
0:1850 0:7770 0:019 0:019
0:1429 0:1429 0:3571 0:3571
0:1429 0:1429 0:3571 0:3571
1CCA ;
The transition probability from the business cycle states into the disaster
states is chosen so as to match the unconditional disaster probability of 0:038,
as reported in Barro and Jin (2011). We thereby assume that it is equally
likely to reach both disaster states. The persistence of the disaster states is
set to match the average duration of GDP disasters, which equals 3.5 years,
see Barro and Jin. Finally, the transition probabilities of the business cycle
states are adjusted to reect the presence of disaster risk.
Since the presence of disaster risk strongly a¤ects the marginally binding
NBLs (they become much tighter and potentially require even positive net
foreign asset positions in all states), we recalibrate the subsistence level for
consumption c. As in section 4 before, we choose c such that in an economy
where bonds must be repaid always, the economy can sustain a maximum net
16Barro (2006) and Gourio (2010) also allow for default on government bonds in disaster
states. Since the focus of their analysis is di¤erent, they use exogenous probabilities and
default rates.
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Figure 2: Optimal Default Policies with Disaster States ( = 0:1)
foreign asset of -100% of average GDP in the business cycle states (zh; zl).17
Choosing tighter limits does not a¤ect the shape of the optimal default policies
but only shifts the policies reported in the next subsection further to the
right.
5.2 Optimal Default with Disasters: Quantitative Analysis
Figure 2 reports the optimal default policies for the economy with disaster
shocks. Each panel in the gure corresponds to a di¤erent productivity state
today and reports the intended amount of default in tomorrows states zl; zd
and zdd as a function of the countrys net foreign asset position today.18
We thereby assume that the dead weight costs of default equal 10% of the
defaulted amount, corresponding to the default cost value used for computing
the lowest row in gure 1.
17This yields an adjusted value of c = 0:198.
18Recall that default is never optimal if zh realizes in the next period.
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Figure 2 shows that it is virtually never optimal to default in the low
business cycle state (zl), unless the net foreign debt position is very close
to its maximally sustainable level, similar to section 4 where we considered
business cycle shocks only. Furthermore, for a wide range of net foreign asset
positions, it is optimal to default if the economy makes a transition from a
business cycle state to a disaster state, see the top panels in the gure. Default
is optimal for a transition to the severe disaster state (zdd), even when the
countrys net foreign asset position is positive before the disaster. Overall,
the optimal amount of default is increasing as the countrys net foreign asset
position worsens. Yet, once the economy is in a disaster state, a further default
in the event that the economy remains in the disaster state is optimal only if
the net foreign asset position is very low, see the bottom panels of gure 2.
Since the likelihood of staying in a disaster state is quite high, choosing not
to repay if the disaster persists would have very high e¤ects on interest rate
costs ex-ante. As a result, serial default in case of a persistent disaster will
not necessarily be part of the optimal default policy.
The overall shape of the optimal default policies is fairly robust to as-
suming di¤erent values for the default costs . Larger costs shift the default
policies towards the left, i.e., default occurs only for more negative net foreign
asset positions. However, higher costs also tighten the maximally sustainable
net foreign asset positions, thereby reducing the range of net foreign asset
positions over which default occurs. Lower cost have the opposite e¤ect, i.e.,
they induce a rightward shift and allow to sustain more negative net foreign
asset positions.
Figure 3 reports a typical sample path for the net foreign asset position
and the amount of default implied by optimal policy for  = 0:1. We start the
path at a zero net foreign asset position and each model period corresponds
to one year. The gure shows that it is optimal to improve the net foreign
asset position when the economy is in the business cycle states, with faster
improvements in the high state. This is the case even though the international
risk free rate is 5 basis points below the inverse of the domestic discount factor.
A transition to a disaster state leads to a default provided the economys net
foreign asset position is not too high (unlike in year 16). Also, following
a disaster, the net foreign asset position deteriorates whenever the disaster
persists for more than one period (see for example year 40), otherwise the
net foreign asset position is largely una¤ected or improves even slightly (see
year 85). Overall, the net foreign asset dynamics are characterized by rapid
deteriorations during persistent disaster periods and gradual improvements
during normal times.
6 Welfare Analysis and Approximate Implementation
This section determines the welfare e¤ects of letting the government choose
whether or not to repay its debt compared to a situation where repayment is
simply forced upon the government (or assumed) in each state. Furthermore,
we study the approximate implementation of optimal default policies via a
16
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Figure 3: The Evolution of Net Foreign Assets and Default under Optimal
Policy ( = 0:1)
combination of equity-like bonds and non-defaultable bonds.
6.1 Welfare Comparison
We now compare the welfare gains associated with optimal default policies to a
setting in which repayment of bonds is required to occur in all states. We base
our welfare comparison on the model with disaster states from section 5 and
consider a broad range of default costs. We evaluate the utility consequences
in terms of welfare equivalent consumption changes over the rst 500 years.
Specically, letting c1t denote the optimal state contingent consumption path
in the no-default economy and c2t the corresponding consumption path with
(costly) default, we report for each level of default costs the welfare equivalent
consumption change ! solving
E0
"
500X
t=0
t
((c1t (1 + !)  c))1 
1  
#
= E0
"
500X
t=0
t
(c2t   c)1 
1  
#
where the expectations are evaluated by averaging over 10000 sample paths.
To highlight the e¤ects of the countrys initial international wealth position,
we consider two scenarios, one where the initial net foreign asset position
is zero and one where it equals -50% of average GDP.19 The outcome of this
19More precisely, we set the initial value of (1 )a 1+ b 1 equal to these values and set
period zero output equal to (k(1)) in both economies and choose z1 = zh.
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Figure 4: Welfare Gains from Using the Default Option
procedure is reported in gure 4. It shows that the welfare gains amount to 1-
2% of consumption each period for a broad range of default costs. The welfare
gains are surprisingly robust to the level of the default costs, instead are more
sensitive to the initial net foreign asset position. Yet, for default costs   0:5
the welfare gains from default decrease steeply. This has to do with the fact
that for such high levels of the default costs it becomes suboptimal to insure
against a future disaster state when the economy is already in a disaster,
independently of the countrys net foreign asset position. This is shown in
the lower panel of gure 5 which reports the optimal default policies when
 = 0:7. With these default costs, the government receives only 0.3 units
of consumption for each unit of default. Since the likelihood of a specic
disaster state (either zd or zdd) to re-occur is 0.3571, the cost of using the
default option for any of these states is 0:3571=(1+r) > 0:3. Therefore, use of
the default option is dominated by using the unconditional bond to transfer
resources into a future disaster state. Repayment therefore optimally occurs
in all future states, once the economy has hit a disaster state. As a result, the
borrowing constraints tighten signicantly20 in the disaster states at this level
of default costs and the required amount of insurance in the business cycle
state (zl; zh) increases strongly as the net foreign asset position deteriorates.
6.2 Approximate Implementation
We now consider a setting where the government issues two kinds of nancial
instruments: a simple non-contingent bond that repays in all future contin-
gencies, as well as an equity-like bond that repays one unit of consumption in
normal times (zh; zl), but zero when a the disaster occurs (either zd or zdd).
20They reach the levels applying in the economy with non-defaultable bonds.
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Figure 5: Optimal Default Policy with Disaster States and High Default Cost
( = 0:7)
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Figure 6: Optimal Equity Bond Issuance ( = 0:1)
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The fact that there is only one instrument but two disaster states implies that
the government bond market is still far from complete, so that it is unclear to
what extent the welfare gains from outright default could approximately be
captured by this simple contingent bond structure. To make the setting with
a contingent bond comparable to the setting with outright default analyzed
in the previous section, we assume that the government must pay a cost  per
unit of equity bond issued in case a disaster state actually materializes. And
to facilitate comparison to the results reported in section 5, we set  = 0:1.
The optimal issuance of equity bonds is reported in gure 6. The gure
shows that the equity bond policies are approximately a convex combination
of the (negative of the) default policies for states zd and zdd shown in gure 2.
The gure reveals that the government optimally issues the equity bond before
an economic disaster actually happens and continues to issue such bonds while
being in a disaster only if the net foreign asset position is su¢ ciently negative.
Figure 7 reports how well the two available nancial instruments allow
to capture the welfare gains induced by optimal default policies, as reported
in gure 4. Specically, the gure depicts the share of the welfare increase
that can be realized with the considered simple asset structure. It shows
that for default cost up to about  = 0:25 there is virtually no di¤erence
between relying on optimal default policies or using the considered simple
assets. This holds independently of the initial net foreign asset position. Yet,
for su¢ ciently high levels of  the simple asset structure cannot capture the
achievable welfare gains from optimal default. Whenever 1    exceeds the
combined persistence of the disaster states (zd and zdd), it becomes subop-
timal to issue the equity bond if the economy is already in a disaster. As
discussed in section 6.1, it is then optimal to issue non-defaultable bonds
only. This tightens the (marginally binding) borrowing limits signicantly
in the disaster states and decreases the opportunities for risk sharing, when
compared to a setting with optimal default policies, where one can insure
against disaster states individually.
7 Long Maturities and Optimal Bond Repurchase Programs
We now discuss the e¤ects of introducing domestic bonds with longer matu-
rity.21 Long bonds can o¤er an advantage over one period bonds, as considered
in the previous part of the paper, if the market value of long bonds reacts
to domestic conditions in a way that allows the government to insure against
domestic shocks. It would be desirable, for example, if the market value
of outstanding long bonds decreases following a disaster shock. This allows
the government to repurchase the outstanding stock of debt at a lower price,
thereby realizing a capital gain that lowers the overall debt burden. Unlike
in Angeletos (2002), capital gains will not materialize unless the government
plans not to repay fully the long bonds in (at least some contingency) in the
future. The depreciation of the market value, thus, can only be induced via
21 Introducing also longer maturities for the risk-free foreign debt has no consequences for
the outcomes.
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Figure 7: Welfare Implications of Approximate Implementation
the anticipation of default in the future when long bonds mature.
Issuing long bonds will o¤er an advantage against outright default on ma-
turing bonds, whenever the dead-weight costs associated with repurchasing
bonds at a devaluated market price is lower than the dead weight costs of an
outright default on maturing bonds today. If both costs are identical, i.e., if
the capital gains on long bonds resulting from default in the future induce
the same costs as a default on maturing bonds, then there will be of no addi-
tional value associated with issuing long bonds. Yet, if the repurchase of long
bonds at low prices fails to produce dead-weight costs, then the government
could fully insure domestic consumption, i.e., achieve the rst best allocation,
independently of the costs associated with an outright default on maturing
bonds. The optimal bond issuance strategy will then have the feature that
the government issues each period long bonds that (partially) default at ma-
turity, depending on the productivity realization tomorrow. The default at
maturity needs to be calibrated such that the capital gains realized tomor-
row fully insure domestic consumption against domestic productivity shocks,
i.e., satises the proportionality restriction (10). Tomorrow, the government
could then repurchase the existing stock of long bonds and issue a new long
bonds with a new contingent repayment prole. In this way outright default
on maturing bonds never occurs.
8 Conclusions
In a setting with incomplete government bond markets, debt default is part
of the optimal government policy under commitment. The choice whether or
not to repay maturing debt allows for increased international risk sharing and
signicantly relaxes the net foreign debt positions that a country can sustain.
21
Moreover, it considerably increases welfare, even when default costs are siz-
able. Default in low productivity states can be part of a countrys optimal
policy in a setting with full commitment, especially if the net foreign asset
position is close to the level implied by the countrys (marginally binding)
natural borrowing limits.
A Appendix
A.1 First Order Equilibrium Conditions
This appendix derives the rst order conditions for problem (5). We rst
rewrite the problem replacing beginning-of-period wealth by components (see
denition (4)):
max
fbt;at0;ekt0;ectcg E0
1X
t=0
tu(ect)
s:t: 8t : ect= ztekt 1 + bt 1 + (1  )at 1(zt)
 ekt   1
1 + r
bt   pt  at
zt+1ekt + bt + (1  )at(zt+1)NBL(zt+1) 8zt+1 2 Zew0 = w0; z0 given;
Next, we formulate the Lagrangian and let t denote the multiplier on the
budget constraint in period t, z
n
t the multiplier for the short-selling con-
straint on the Arrow security that pays o¤ in state zn in t+ 1, and !t+1 the
multiplier associated with the natural borrowing limits. We drop the inequal-
ity constraints for ekt and ect, as the Inada conditions guarantee an interior
solution for these variables. Di¤erentiating the Lagrangian with respect to
the choice variables one obtains
ect : u0(ect)  t = 0
bt :  t
1
1 + r
+ Ett+1 + Et!t+1 = 0
at(z
n) :  tpt(zn) + (znjzt)t+1(zn)(1  )
+z
n
t + (z
njzt)!t+1(zn)(1  ) = 0 8n 2 Nekt :  t + ek 1t Ett+1zt+1 + ek 1t Et!t+1zt+1 = 0
Using the FOC for consumption to replace t in the last three FOCs, one
obtains Euler equations for the bond holdings, the Arrow securities and capital
investment:
Bond : u0(ect) 1
1 + r
+ Etu
0(ect+1) + Et!t+1 = 0 (11a)
Arrow : u0(ect)pt(zn) + (znjzt)u0(ect+1(zn))(1  )
+z
n
t + (z
njzt)!t+1(zn)(1  ) = 0 8n 2 N (11b)
Capital : u0(ect) + ek 1t Etu0(ect+1)zt+1 + ek 1t Et!t+1zt+1 = 0(11c)
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In addition, the Kuhn-Tucker FOCs include the following complementarity
conditions:
0 at(zn) ? znt  0 8n 2 N (11d)
0 znekt + bt + (1  )aznt  NBL(zn) ? !t+1(zn))  0 8n 2 N:(11e)
Combined with the budget constraint, the Euler equations and the comple-
mentarity conditions constitute the optimality conditions for problem (5).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We rst show that the proposed consumption solution (8) satises the budget
constraint, that the inequality constraints a  0 are not binding, and that
the NBLs are also not binding. Thereafter, we show that the remaining rst
order conditions of problem (5), as derived in appendix A.1, also hold.
We start by showing that the portfolio implementing (8) in period t = 1
is consistent with the ow budget constraint and a  0. The result for
subsequent periods follows by induction. In period t = 1 with productivity
state zn, beginning-of-period wealth under the optimal capital investment
strategy (9) is ewn1  zn (k(z0)) + b0 + a0(zn) (12)
To insure that consumption can stay constant from t = 1 onwards we need
again
c = (1  )((zn) + ewn1 ) (13)
for all possible productivity realizations n = 1; ::N . This provides N condi-
tions that can be used to determine the N + 1 variables b0 and a0(zn) for
n = 1; :::; N . We also have the condition a0(zn)  0 for all n and by choosing
minn a0(z
n) = 0, we get one more condition that allows to pin down a unique
portfolio (b0; a0). Note that the inequality constraints on a do not bind for
the portfolio choice, as we have one degree of freedom, implying that the mul-
tipliers vzn1 in appendix A.1 are all zero. It remains to show that the portfolio
achieving (13) is feasible given the initial wealth ew0. Using (12) to substituteewn1 in equation (13) we get
c = (1  )((zn) + zn (k(z0)) + b0 + a0(zn))8n = 1; :::N:
Combining with (8) we get
(zn) + zn (k(z0)) + b0 + a0(zn) = (z0) + ew0
Multiplying the previous equation with (znjz0) and summing over all n one
obtains
E0 [(z1) + z1 (k
(z0))] + b0 +
NX
n=1
(znjz0)a0(zn) = (z0) + ew0:
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Using (z0) =  k(z0) + E0 [z1 (k(zt+j))] + E0 [(z1)] and (3) the pre-
vious equation delivers
(1  )E0 [(z1) + z1 (k(z0))] + b0 + (1 + r)p0a0 =  k(z0) + ew0
Using  = 1=(1 + r) this can be written as
(1  )E0 [(z1) + z1 (k(z0))]
+
1  

p0a0 + (1  )b0 + 1
1 + r
b0 + p0a0= k(z0) + ew0 (14)
From (13) follows that the rst terms in the previous equation are equal to
(1  )E0 [(z1) + z1 (k(z0))] + 1  

p0a0 + (1  )b0 = c
so that (14) is just the budget equation for period zero. The portfolio giving
rise to (13) in t = 1 thus satises the budget constraint of period zero. The
results for t  1 follow by induction.
It then follows from equation (13) that ewt is bounded, as (zt) is bounded,
so that the process for beginning-of-period wealth does not involve explosive
debt. The NBLs are thus not binding so that the multipliers !t+1 = 0 for all
t and all contingencies.
Using vznt  0, !t+1  0, the fact that capital investment is given by (9)
and that the Arrow security price is (3), the Euler conditions (11a) - (11c)
then all hold when consumption is given by (8). This completes the proof.
A.3 Numerical Solution Approach
To compute recursive equilibria for Problem 5 we apply a global solution
method as to account for the non-linear default policies in our model. As
endogenous state variable we use beginning-of-period wealth, dened as above.
Combined with exogenous productivity shocks we dene our state space S to
be
S =

z1  NBL(z1); wmax ; :::; zN  NBL(zN ); wmax	
where we set wmax such that in equilibrium optimal policies never imply
wealth values above this threshold. The NBLs are set such they are marginally
binding. How these values are derived is shown in Appendix A.4.
We want to describe equilibrium in terms of time-invariant policy functions
that map the current state into current policies. Hence, we want to compute
policies ef : (zt; wt)! (fct; kt; bt; atg) ;
where their values (approximately) satisfy the equilibrium conditions derived
above. We use a time iteration algorithm where equilibrium policy func-
tions are approximated iteratively. In a time iteration procedure, one takes
tomorrows policy (denoted by fnext) as given and solves for the optimal
policy today (denoted by f) which in turn is used to update the guess for
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tomorrows policy. Convergence is achieved once jjf   fnextjj <  and we setef = f . In each time iteration step we solve for optimal policies on a su¢ -
cient number of grid points distributed over the continuous part of the state
space. Between grid points we use linear splines to interpolate tomorrows
consumption policy. Following Garcia and Zangwill (1981), we can transform
the complementarity conditions of our rst order equilibrium conditions into
equations. To solve for a root of the resulting non-linear equation system at
a particular grid point we use Zienas Knitro, an optimization software that
can be called from Matlab. For more details on the time iteration procedure
and how one transforms complementarity conditions into equations, see for
example, Brumm and Grill (2010). To come up with a starting guess for the
consumption policy we use the fact that at the NBLs optimal consumption
equals the subsistence level. We therefore guess a convex, monotonically in-
creasing function g which satises g(zi; NBL(zi)) = c 8i and use a reasonable
value for g(zi; wmax).
A.4 Natural Borrowing Limits (NBLs)
In this section we derive the NBLs that we use as lower bounds of the state
space in our numerical application. For each state we dene the NBL as the
maximum level of indebtedness that is still consistent with non-explosive debt.
To put it di¤erently, we determine the minimum level of beginning-of-period
wealth that is necessary to nance the capital stock and portfolio (assuming
consumption equal to the subsistence level) such that in all possible states
tomorrow beginning-of-period wealth is at or above the respective limit. To
compute these bounds we use Problem 5, simplifying the exhibition substan-
tially and yielding the same solution as for Problem 2. To derive these state
dependent borrowing limits we proceed as follows: we rst postulate poten-
tial solutions. Then we set up the problem that yields the minimum level
of wealth today that can nance a portfolio such that in all possible states
tomorrow wealth is above the postulated solution. We use this problem for-
mulation to derive the capital and portfolio decisions requiring the lowest
level of wealth today and at the same time satisfy the wealth constraints in
all states tomorrow. Using these optimal choices we can then set up the linear
equation system to back out the minimum levels of wealth that can just be
nanced. To simplify exhibition we consider just two possible TFP shocks
(N=2), denoted by z1 and z2. However, it is straightforward to extend our
analysis to the general case of N TFP shocks, as we argue below. Note that
we use only one Arrow security, the one for state 2. This choice is without loss
of generality as with positive default cost costs will be minimized and there-
fore the government will not acquire Arrow securities for the state where the
least funds are needed. Without default costs, we can as well omit the Arrow
security for the best productivity state as we have more assets than states
available for trade. Finally note that we omit the short selling constraint on
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the Arrow security to simplify the exhibition22.
Step 1:
We denote potential solution by w1 and w2.
Step 2:
For a given state s 2 f1; 2g, we now want to determine the minimum level
of wealth necessary to ensure that wealth tomorrow (w(s)tom)is above the
postulated bounds:
min w(s)
s:t: w(1)tomw1
w(2)tomw2
We can now use the budget constraint that is implied by consumption equal
to the subsistence level c: c = w(s) k  q  b pzs a; and use it to substitute
w(s)in the above minimization problem:
min
k;b;a
c+ k + q  b+ pzs  a;
s:t: z1k + bw1
z2k + b+ (1  )aw2
using w(1)tom = z1k + b and w(2)tom = z2k + b+ (1  )a.
The Lagrangian for this optimization problem has the following form:
L = c+ k + q  b+ ps  a+ 1(z1k + b  w1) + 2(z2k + b+ (1  )a  w2);
We can now derive rst order conditions for all states. Solving these conditions
for optimal choices in state 1 (state 2 is analogous) we get
k1opt =

1
(z2p1   z1(p1   q))
 1
 1
;
b1opt =w
1   z1(k1opt);
a1opt =
w2   z2(k1opt)   b1opt
(1  ) :
Step 3:
We now come back to the original xed point problem: we want to determine
the minimum values of wealth necessary to ensure that we are not below these
values tomorrow. By setting the optimal choices derived above (which are a
22When computing the NBLs in our numerical applications, it is important to take the
short-selling constraints into account as with positive default costs they may actually be
binding at the NBL
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function of wealth) equal to the postulated wealth levels, the original xed
point problem translates into a linear equation system that yields in general
a unique solution:
w1= c+ k1opt + q  b1opt + p1  a1opt
w2= c+ k2opt + q  b2opt + p2  a2opt
Plugging in the optimal capital and portfolio choices derived above, we are left
with an linear equation system containing only the wealth levels and exoge-
nous parameters. The solution of the equation system yields the NBLs that
we need for our numerical applications. For the general case of N TFP shocks,
the analysis is conceptually equivalent, as the structure of the Lagrangian is
preserved.
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